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FIXING THE LANDWARD COVERAGE OF THE 1972
AMENDMENTS TO THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND
HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
INTRODUCTION
In 1917, the United States Supreme Court, in Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen,' held that an award of benefits under a state workmen's
compensation statute to the widow of a fatally injured longshoreman was
unconstitutional because the decedent's accident had taken place on the
navigable waters of the United States.2 This decision marked the beginning
of more than fifty years of conflict between the Supreme Court and Congress
over the methods, limitations, and interpretation of federal statutory efforts
to provide workmen's compensation coverage for longshoremen, dock
workers, and other maritime3 employees injured during the course of their
employment on the navigable waters. In 1972, Congress attempted to resolve
this dispute by substantially amending the key federal statute granting
workmen's compensation benefits to injured maritime workers, the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927 (LHCA).4
Unfortunately, Congress' efforts have only spawned a new and equally
perplexing series of problems. Indeed, litigation concerning the amended
LHCA has occurred in a number of substantive areas.5 One current problem
is of particular interest - the nature and extent of the Act's coverage. The
primary difficulty stems from two interrelated sections of the amended Act,
sections 903(a) and 902(3), which respectively contain the so-called "situs"
and "status" requirements for coverage.6 Section 903(a) makes federal
1. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
2. All waters, whether salt or fresh, tidal or nontidal, natural or artificial, which
are navigable for either interstate or foreign commerce purposes, are "navigable
waters." This includes the high seas, ports and harbors that connect with the high
seas, the Great Lakes, and various rivers and lakes (even though totally contained
within the border of one state). See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY
§ 1-11 at 31-33 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
3. "Maritime" is defined as "[c]onnected with the sea in respect to navigation,
commerce, etc.; pertaining to, or having to do with, navigation and naval affairs or
shipping and commerce by sea." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1503
(2d ed. 1942).
4. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970), as amended by Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (Supp. V 1975)).
5. See, e.g., Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Director, 542 F.2d 602 (3d Cir.
1976) (employee, under certain conditions, is entitled to counsel fees when he
successfully gains compensation award that his employer resisted).
6. In terms of the amended Act, "situs" refers to the location, be it on land or
water, where the employee incurred his or her injury. "Status" refers to the nature of
the duties performed by the injured employee.
"Situs" and "status" are concepts with deep historical roots in admiralty
jurisdiction. However, while the "situs" concept is used in an identical fashion by
both the amended LHCA and admiralty jurisdiction, the same is not true for "status."
In admiralty jurisdiction, "status" is the conceptual basis for a suit in contract. In
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workmen's compensation coverage available to any "employee" if he is
injured "upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any
adjoining pier, wharf, drydock, terminal, building way, marine railway or
other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading,
repairing, or building a vessel)." 7 Section 902(3) then defines an "employee"
to be "any person engaged in maritime employment, including any
longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations."
These two sections significantly alter the operation of the original 1927
LHCA. First, section 903(a) of the amended Act extends federal coverage to
a variety of land-based, port-related areas located outside the traditional
geographic ambit of "navigable waters." 9 In other words, within the
perimeters of section 903(a)'s coverage an injured employee can claim LHCA
benefits without regard to his land or water situs at the time of injury. This
contrasts sharply with the original section 903(a) of the 1927 Act which,
with one exception, 10 limited federal coverage exclusively to those employees
who incurred injury on the "navigable waters," as conventionally defined.
The second major change, found in section 902(3) of the amended Act,
predicates coverage on the nature of the employee's work assignment. To
obtain LHCA coverage, the injured employee must perform tasks which
possess a relationship with maritime commerce and shipping sufficient to
qualify as "maritime employment." Unlike the 1927 Act, federal coverage no
longer extends to a given employee merely because his accident takes place
on the "navigable waters." Instead, the employee now must also have the
"status" of being engaged in "maritime employment.""
The courts have encountered considerable difficulty in reconciling these
two prerequisites for coverage 12 with technological changes, such as
containerization,13 that have revolutionized the manner in which cargo is
contrast to the amended LHCA, it refers not to the type of activity engaged in by the
employee, but to the subject matter of the contract upon which the suit is based. See
note 28 infra.
7. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp. V 1975).
8. Id. at § 902(3) (Supp. V 1975).
9. See note 2 supra.
10. The 1927 LHCA permitted coverage to extend shoreward to drydock facilities.
33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1970) (amended 1972).
11. Under the 1927 Act, an employee was defined only in negative terms: "The
term 'employee' does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any
person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under
eighteen tons net." 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1970) (amended 1972). Interpretation of the term
"employee" under the 1927 Act is discussed at note 45 infra.
12. One commentator has argued that a third prerequisite for coverage exists -
the employer of the injured employee must have employees engaged in maritime
employment. See Vickery, Some Impacts of the 1972 Amendments to the Longshore-
men's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 41 INS. COUNSEL J. 63, 68 (1974). No
court has accepted this contention.
13. "Containerization" refers to the process of transporting maritime cargo in
large, prepacked shipping units. These units, known as containers, are
large metal boxes into which smaller crates, boxes, bags, barrels or other such
packages are consolidated for shipment to a single destination, even though the
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handled in a modern port.14 In general, assuming the situs requirement is
met, the difficulty lies in determining which employees in a diversified port
operation are eligible for federal coverage in light of the cryptic statutory
phrase "any person engaged in maritime employment, including any
longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations."' 15 More
specifically, the problem currently confronting the courts is whether the
"status" criterion in section 902(3) of the amended Act- was enacted with the
goal of extending coverage to longshoremen engaged in loading and
unloading duties which, while not traditionally perforthed by longshoremen,
are nonetheless performed by them with increasing frequency in contempor-
ary ports.
Six United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have rendered opinions on
this matter, 6 with the analysis splitting into three primary theories. The
narrowest view is that only those employees handling cargo in the area
between the hold of the ship and the "point of rest," that is, the first or last
land-based cargo storage area on the pier, can be described as "engaged in
maritime employment."' 7 Under a somewhat broader view, the status test is
satisfied if the employee incurred his injury while performing cargo
handling tasks which are "functionally equivalent" to those performed by
longshoremen in the past.'8 In the event the tasks being performed at the
time of injury are not "functionally equivalent," the employee is still
various contents may be meant for multiple consignees. Ordinarily containers are
shipped on vessels specifically designed for carrying containers, and loaded or
unloaded at special container facilities.
Brief for Petitioner at 5 n.3, I.T.O. Co., Inc. v. Blundo, cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 522
(1976) (No. 76-454).
After a container is removed from the vessel by an overhead crane, it is placed
on a chassis with wheels. The container can then be hauled by a tractor to various
locations within the marine terminal facility and over the highways. Its physical
appearance on the highway resembles that of the conventional tractor-trailer. Id.
14. See, e.g., A. EVANS, TECHNICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES IN THE WORLD'S PORTS
(1969).
15. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (Supp. V 1975).
16. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533-(5th Cir. 1976), petitions
for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1976) (No. 76-641), 45 U.S.L.W. 3450 (U.S.
Dec. 27, 1976) (No. 76-880); I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir.
1976) (en banc), vacating 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), petitions for cert. filed, 45
U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1976) (No. 76-706), 45 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1976)
(No. 76-730); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Director, 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976); Stockman
v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1976), petition for cert.filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1976) (No. 76-571); Pittgtoh Stevedoring Corp. v.
Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub riom., Northeast Marine
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1976) (Nos. 76-444, -454); Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied; 97 S. Ct: 179 (1976).
17. I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 542 F.2d 903 (4th, Cir. 19761 (en banc),
vacating 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), petitions for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S.
Nov. 19, 1976) (No. 76-706), 45 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Nov. 24; 1976) (No. 76-730). See
text accompanying notes 71 to 98 infra.
18. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom., Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 97 S. -Ct. 522 (1976) (Nos. 76-
444,-454). See text accompanying notes 99 to 126 infra.
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considered to be "engaged in maritime employment" if he has spent a
substantial part of his time in the past actually taking cargo on or off a
vessel.19 Finally, the broadest view of the amended Act is that any employee
participating in an "integral part of the process" of moving maritime cargo
to or from land transport is "engaged in maritime employment. ' 20 The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in one of these cases to examine the
problem of the Act's coverage.21 This Comment will explore the background
of this problem, analyze and criticize the theories developed by the courts of
appeals, and discuss some of the broader issues arising from the contro-
versy.
BACKGROUND
The movement in the United States to provide a system of guaranteed
compensation coverage for workmen injured during the course of their
employment began in the early 1900's.22 Advocates of such legislation
concentrated their efforts at the state level, but most legislatures, fearful
that compensation statutes violated the Constitution, proceeded cau-
tiously. 23 In March, 1917, the Supreme Court dispelled these apprehensions
when it ruled that workmen's compensation statutes did not necessarily
violate the Constitution. 24
Several months later, however, the Supreme Court, in Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen,25 found serious constitutional problems did exist with regard
to the application of state compensation legislation to a person whose work
was maritime in nature and who suffered injury on the navigable waters of
the United States. In Jensen, a longshoreman working in the port of New
York- was fatally injured on the gangway of-aship while he assisted in the-
unloading process. 26 The Court observed that in such an instance, the two
19. Id.
20. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), petitions
for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1976) (No. 76-641), 45 U.S.L.W. 3450 (U.S.
Dec. 27, 1976) (No. 76-880). See text accompanying notes 127 to 136 infra.
21. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom., Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1976).
22. The standard features of a workmen's compensation statute are discussed in 1
A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10 (1972). [Hereinafter cited
as LARSON].
23. Id. at § 5.20. The basic fear was that holding employers strictly liable for
accidents involving their employees might violate the due process clause.
24. New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243
U.S. 210 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917). The White
Court found there was no fourteenth amendment bar to state legislation which held
employers strictly liable to their injured employees and which abolished the defenses
of assumption of risk, the fellow servant doctrine, and contributory negligence. 243
U.S. at 198-200. After these three decisions, the pace of enactment quickened. By
1920, only eight states were without workmen's compensation statutes. 1 LARSON,
supra note 22, at §§ 5.20-5.30.
25. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
26. Jensen was driving a small electric freight truck loaded with lumber out of a
vessel when the truck became lodged against the guide pieces of the gangway. Jensen
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traditional grounds for invoking the federal judiciary's exclusive admiralty
jurisdiction 27 - a maritime locality (situs) and a contract with a maritime
subject matter (status) - were clearly present.28 The rights and liabilities of
the parties regarding Jensen's death were therefore to be governed by the
general maritime law.
29
Under the general maritime law, Jensen's survivors had the right to sue
his employer, the Southern Pacific Company, for damages in a maritime tort
action. 30 Similarly, Southern Pacific had the right to raise all available
defenses in such an action and, if possible, escape liability altogether. The
Court noted that both of these rights had been extinguished under the
provisions of the New York Workmen's Compensation Act;31 the employee's
sole remedy was to file a claim for the statutorily regulated benefits of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, and the employer was held strictly liable.
reversed the direction of the truck and went through the hatchway back into the ship.
But he neglected to lower his head and struck the top line of the ship, suffering a
broken neck. Id. at 208.
27. The exclusive nature of the federal admiralty jurisdiction is derived from
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, which states: "The Judicial
power shall extend to . . .all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ...."
However, the word "exclusive" has a special meaning in terms of federal admiralty
jurisdiction. It does not relate to the forum for adjudication because in personam
maritime actions may be freely heard by state courts under the "saving to suitors"
clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970) (original version at ch. 20,
§ 9, 1 Stat. 77 (1850)). See GiLMoRE & BLACK, supra note 2, at § 1-13. Instead,
"exclusive" applies to the controlling body of law that governs maritime matters in
general. Thus, in the majority of maritime cases, the application of the "general
maritime law," as developed by the federal courts and Congress, is required. Contrary
state law which conflicts with the "general maritime law" is invalid. Id. at §§ 1-16 to
1-18. For a discussion of other problems involving the "saving to suitors" clause, see
note 36 infra.
28. Justice Story, while on circuit in 1815, established these two criteria for
admiralty coverage. He commented that:
On the whole, I am, without the slightest hesitation, ready to pronounce, that
the delegation of cognizance of "all civil cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction" to the courts of the United States comprehends all maritime
contracts, torts, and injuries. The latter branch is necessarily bounded by locality
[i.e. situs]; the former extends over all contracts, (wheresoever they may be made
or executed.. .) which relate to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea
[i.e. status].
De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776).
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has recently limited
admiralty tort jurisdiction to those injuries which have some "significant relation-
ship" with "traditional maritime activity." See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972).
The use of "status" in defining admiralty jurisdiction should not be confused
with the use of "status" in the amended LHCA. See note 6 supra.
29. 244 U.S. at 217-18.
30. GiLMOR & BLACK, supra note 2, at § 6-4.
31. 244 U.S. at 210-11. The "agreement" that the employer is held strictly liable
and the employee is deemed to have waived his right to sue in tort (the employee
taking a lesser amount in guaranteed benefits instead) lies at the heart of a
workmen's compensation act. See LARSON, supra note 22, at §1.10.
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The Jensen Court ruled that state legislation of this nature could not
constitutionally cover longshoremen when they were injured on the
navigable waters. The source of the Court's holding was Article III, section 2
of the Constitution, under which the power to control the nation's maritime
law impliedly was granted solely to the federal government.32 The rationale
for this grant, said the Court, was that the freedom to navigate required,
above all, a uniform national maritime law. 33 By extinguishing certain
rights of employers and employees, the New York statute had materially
altered the general maritime law and thereby jeopardized that law's
uniformity. For this reason, the Court held that application of the
Workmen's Compensation Act to longshoremen working on the navigable
waters was unconstitutional.
In practical terms, the Jensen holding meant that state workmen's
compensation protection abruptly terminated when a longshoreman stepped
from the shore onto the gangplank. A longshoreman suffering an injury
while moving cargo on the shore would receive compensatory state benefits;
his co-worker, suffering the same injury while moving the same cargo on
board ship, would receive nothing. Thus, the water's edge - later termed the
"Jensen line" - became the boundary between state and federal jurisdic-
tion.34
This disturbing anomaly in coverage prompted immediate action by the
United States Congress. Nevertheless, in enacting remedial legislation,
Congress totally disregarded the Jensen Court's pronouncements on the
need for national uniformity in maritime law. Instead, Congress chose to
respond to a relatively minor point in the Jensen decision - the Court's
rejection 35 of the theory that state compensation acts could permissibly
cover workmen injured on the navigable waters by virtue of the "saving to
suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act.3 6 Apparently, Congress believed it could
successfully overcome the Court's objections by amending the saving clause
32. See note 27 infra.
33. 244 U.S. at 217.
34. It should be noted, however, that the worker injured seaward of the Jensen
line could still sue his employer in a maritime tort action.
35. 244 U.S. at 218.
36. The "saving to suitors" clause, prior to 1948, read as follows:
[T]he district courts ... shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . .. saving to suitors, in all cases,
the right of the common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give
it ....
1 Stat. 76-77 (1850). A slightly modified version, enacted in 1948, is found at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333 (1970).
The saving clause makes it clear that maritime actions involving common
law remedies need not be brought solely in federal court. State courts are fully
competent in such instances. See GiLMoRE & BLAcK, supra note 2, at § 1-13. In
Jensen, however, the Supreme Court ruled that state compensation act remedies were
"of a character wholly unknown to the common law," and therefore "not saved to
suitors from the grant of exclusive jurisdiction." 244 U.S. at 218. This conclusion has
been viewed skeptically by the commentators. See, e.g., GiLMOR & BLAcK, supra note
2, at § 6-45, at 405-06.
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to allow states the power to extend the coverage of their existing
compensation acts to maritime workers.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court proved unreceptive to this simple
expedient. Twice Congress amended the saving clause,3 and twice the Court
rejected the amendment as a constitutionally invalid delegation of federal
power to state government. 3 As a result,. the congressional effort to fix
responsibility at the state level39 for the provision of workmen's compensa-
tion coverage for all longshoremen, regardless of the shore or water situs of
their injury, reached "a Constitutional dead-end. '40
The Court, however, in dicta, left open an alternative method for
remedying the problems created by the Jensen line. Although Congress had
no authority to extend the jurisdiction of state statutes seaward into the
maritime area, it did have the power to enact "a general employers' liability
law or general provisions for compensating injured employees. '41 Congress
eventually responded to this suggestion by enacting its own compensation
statute - the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of
1927.42
While the 1927 Act closely resembled the typical state wbrkmen's
compensation statute,43 it also clearly reflected the congressional belief that,
in general, workmen's compensation coverage was a state matter. Section
903(a) of the Act was narrowly drawn to cover only. those workers excluded
from state coverage by virtue of the Jensen decision:
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of
disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death
results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the
United States (including any drydock) and if recovery for the disability
or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly
be provided by State law.44
Three requirements for coverage are evident in the above-quoted section.
First, the injured party had to be an -"employee." By applying two
interrelated sections of the Act, courts interpreted this term to mean any
person working for a business concern or.individual having at least one
37. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-82, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395; Act of June 10, 1922,
Pub. L. No. 67-239, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634.
38. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. W.C.
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
39. The Supreme Court, years later, acknowledged that the aim of Congress
during this period had indeed been to place the responsibility for workmen's
compensation on the states. See Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 117-18
(1962).
40. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, § 6-46, at 408.
41. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227 (1924).
42. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970) (amended 1972). The 1927 Act was found to be
constitutional in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
43. Indeed, the LHCA was patterned on the New York Workmen's Compensation
Act. 3 LARSON, supra note 22, at § 89.10.
"44. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1970) (amended 1972).
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employee working upon the navigable waters. 45 In other words, the Act only
specified that some employees of the employer had to have a maritime
"status"; the injured employee himself need not have such status. Second,
and more importantly, the employee's injury had to occur on the navigable
waters of the United States. Stated simply, maritime situs was the crucial
prerequisite for coverage. Finally, the employee's injury could not also be
covered by any state compensation system.
From the start, the 1927 Act proved to be an administrative and judicial
quagmire. 4" In particular, the Supreme Court's repeated attempts to
determine the exact geographic location of the jurisdictional interface
between the federal and state compensation acts produced confusion,
arbitrariness, and disparate treatment for injured longshoremen performing
seemingly similar, if not identical, activities. The problem first surfaced with
the "maritime but local" doctrine, which influenced the application of the
LHCA from 1927 to 1942. Developed in a series of post-Jensen but pre-Act
cases, this doctrine allowed the jurisdiction of state workmen's compensa-
tion acts, in limited circumstances, to extend seaward of the Jensen line to
include employees injured on the navigable waters. 47 The sole prerequisite
for such an extension was a finding that the nature of the work performed
by the longshoreman at the time of his injury, even though indisputably
maritime, nonetheless was of mere local (as opposed to national) impor-
tance. In such a case, the application of the compensation laws of the
various states would neither "work material prejudice to any characteristic
feature of the general maritime law, [n]or interfere with the proper harmony
or uniformity of that law in its international or interstate relations." 4
The "maritime but. local" doctrine was originally designed to soften the
impact of Jensen during the pre-Act years.49 This outcome was to be
achieved by allowing the state compensation acts to extend as far seaward
45. As noted earlier, the 1927 Act defined an "employee" solely in negative terms.
See note 17 supra. Therefore, it became customary to define an "employee" as anyone
who worked for a party that met the Act's definition of an "employer," which was a
party "any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in
part, upon the navigable -waters of the United States (including any drydock)." 33
U.S.C. § 902(4) (1970) (amended 1972). See 10 SuFFoLK U.L. REV. 1179, 1180 (1976).
46. See GiLMOR & BLACK, supra note 2, at § 6-46.
47. See, e.g., Grant Smith-Porter. Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922)
(application of state compensation law to employee injured on the navigable waters
while building a ship is permissible because shipbuilding contracts are historically
nonmaritime in status; therefore state compensation act would not materially
interfere with the nationwide uniformity of the general maritime law); State Indus.
Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922) (application of state compensation
law is permissible because employee's fatal injuries were incurred on a dock which,
although extending over navigable waters, was considered a land situs.)
48. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 476 (1922). An employee
engaged in work of a "maritime but local" nature could claim benefits only under the
applicable state compensation act. He could not sue his employer in admiralty and, as
will subsequently be apparent, neither could he claim benefits under the LHCA.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, § 6-49, at 419.
49. GiLMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, § 6-49, at 419.
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as constitutionally permissible. However, when built into the LHCA,5° the
"maritime but local" doctrine succeeded only in adding a harsh element to
the administration of the Act. The division of the multitude of activities
performed in a port into categories of "local" or "national" importance
proceeded solely on a case-by-case basis.5 l As a result, attorneys represent-
ing longshoremen injured on the navigable waters while performing as yet
uncategorized activities frequently could only guess whether filing a claim
under the state or federal statute was the proper course to pursue. With the
two acts being mutually exclusive, the end-results were completely at odds
with the goal of a typical workmen's compensation scheme: compensation
was slow and uncertain, and litigation became more frequent and more
costly. Moreover, many claimants, discovering only after trial that they had
filed under the wrong act, received no benefits at all - the statute of
limitations barred their claim for compensatory benefits under the
alternative act.52
In 1942, the Supreme Court, in Davis v. Department of Labor and
Industries,53 effectively scrapped the "maritime but local" distinction.
Justice Black, writing the majority opinion, announced that a new theory
would henceforth govern the issue of state versus federal compensation act
coverage for injuries incurred on the navigable waters. In certain factual
situations, a "twilight zone" existed where the coverage question could be
decided only on a case-by-case basis.5 4 However, Justice Black strongly
implied that in such cases, the state and federal statutes would no longer be
mutually exclusive;55 instead, they would have concurrent jurisdiction.56
50. To most observers, the "maritime but local" doctrine was built into the LHCA
by virtue of the "may not validly be provided by state law" language found in § 903(a)
of the Act (quoted in full at text accompanying note 44 supra). See GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 2, § 6-49, at 419. But see Calbeck V. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962),
where Justice Brennan argued the "may not validly be provided by state law"
language was a mere repetition .of the Act's "navigable waters" requirement found in
the first half of § 903(a). 370 U.S. at 126. For a complete discussion of Justice
Brennan's point of view (which, in terms of its theory rather than its result, was
soundly* denounced by most commentators), see i5. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND
FEDERALISM (1970), app. G [hereinafter cited as ROBERTSON].
51. For an extensive listing of these cases, see 3 LARSON, supra note 22, at § 89.22.
52. See, e.g., Ayres v. Parker, 15 F. Supp. 447 (D. Md. 1934) (employee, who had
mistakenly filed claim under state .compensation act, was barred by statute of
limitations from filing claim under the LHCA). The statute of limitations for the 1927
LHCA tolled one year after the injury. 33 U.S.C. § 913 (1970) (amended 1972).
53. 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
54. In essence, the "twilight zone" was merely a new name for the old "maritime
but local" cases. To the Court, the "twilight zone" involved that type of employment
which, "by reason of particular facts, could fall on either side" of the Jensen line,
resulting in seeming coverage for an employee under either a federal and/or state
workmen's compensation statute. Id. at 255-56.
55. Id. at 256-58.
56. The way to achieve this result was only vaguely hinted at in the majority
opinion. To Chief Justice Stone, dissenting, the majority's result could be reached only
by indulging in two interrelated presumptions - that an award under a state
compensation act was to be presumed valid and that an award under the federal
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Indeed, this was largely the reading the lower courts gave to the decision.5 7
Some twenty years later, concurrent jurisdiction for injuries incurred
seaward of the Jensen line was explicitly recognized by the Court in Calbeck
v. Travelers Insurance Co.58
Unfortunately, the jurisdictional problems plaguing the Act were by no
means at an end. Davis and Calbeck had only resolved how far seaward
state compensation acts permissibly could extend. The question how far
landward the coverage of the federal statute could advance did not reach the
Court until 1969. In Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson,5 9 a consolidated
appeal involving three longshoremen injured (one fatally) on various piers
while loading ships, the Court ruled the three claimants were not eligible for
compensation under the LHCA. Congress, said the Court, had clearly
chosen a water situs to be the determinative test for coverage under the
Act.60 Since piers historically had been treated as a land situs,61 the Court
reasoned that the injuries had not occurred, as required by the Act, "upon
the navigable waters of the United States." Therefore, the LHCA did not
cover these three claimants. The Court noted that if Congress desired to
cover longshoremen injured landward of the Jensen line, it could easily do
so on the basis of their "status," since longshoremen work under
employment contracts with a maritime subject matter.62 Such changes,
however, were a matter for the legislature, not the judiciary, and therefore
the Court declined to extend the coverage of the LHCA landward onto the
pier.6 3
Nacirema clearly foreclosed any possibility under the 1927 LHCA of
equal treatment for longshoremen injured while performing essentially
identical tasks on the dock as opposed to the vessel. Longshoremen were
condemned to endure ever-shifting compensation coverage because, in the
course of a day's work, they constantly crossed back and forth between the
pier, a land situs, and the vessel, a water situs. However, this was not the
only effect of Nacirema. The decision came to stand for an even more
startling anomaly - that two longshoremen working on the pier would
receive different benefits if, as a result of their accidents, one longshoreman
fell into the water while the other fell to the ground.6 4
statute was to be treated similarly. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at § 6-49, at
420.
57. ROBERTSON, supra note 50, at 211-12.
58. 370 U.S. 114 (1962). However, Calbeck employed a line of reasoning
completely different from that used in Davis. See authorities collected in note 50
supra. As a practical matter, the Calbeck decision allowed injured employees to file for
either state or federal compensation benefits.
59. 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
60. Id. at 223-24.
61. Id. at 214-15.
62. Id. at 215-16 n.7.
63. Id. at 223-24.
64. When the Nacirema case was originally argued in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, four separate cases involving four different
longshoremen were consolidated for the appeal. See Marine Stevedoring Corp. v.
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The Nacirema Court's ruling that the LHCA did not cover longshore-
men injured landward of the Jensen line proved to be only one source of
dissatisfaction with the 1927 Act. Low benefit levels 65 and extensive third
party litigation6 6 also stimulated calls for reform. As a result, Congress
Oosting, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968) (en banc). In three of the four accidents, the
longshoremen physically remained on the pier during the entire occurrence. However,
in the fourth accident, the longshoreman was hurled off the pier into the water. The
Fourth Circuit ruled all four claimants qualified for coverage under the LHCA.
The employers appealed only those three cases where the claimants' injuries
were sustained entirely on the land. It was the award of federal benefits to these three
longshoremen that was reversed in Nacirema. The mere fact that a claimant was
injured in such a way as to catapault him into the water consequently became a
decisive factor in resolving the issue of state versus federal coverage. The Fourth
Circuit, found such a distinction "harsh and incongruous." Id. at 907. The Supreme
Court acknowledged that this state of affairs was not desirable, but concluded that
the incongruities could not be avoided under the 1927 Act. 396 U.S. at 223-24.
65. Prior to the 1972 amendments, the maximum compensation for disability was
$70 per week, a figure which had not been increased since 1961. 33 U.S.C. § 906(b)
(1970) (amended 1972). As the average longshoreman's wage in 1972 approached $200
per week, the 1927 Act clearly failed to provide an adequate income replacement for
injured employees. See SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1972, S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
Under the amended Act, the schedule of benefits was raised significantly. The Act
ensures that the vast majority of injured workers receive approximately two-thirds of
their average weekly wage as compensation for disability.
66. Following the basic concept underlying most workmen's compensation
legislation, the 1927 LHCA ensured that a given longshoreman received compensa-
tory benefits for injuries incurred in employment-related accidents, regardless of the
presence or absence of negligence on the part of his employer. The longshoreman,
however, gave up his right to sue his employer in a tort action. The longshoreman's
sole remedy against his employer in the event of injury was to file a claim for benefits
under the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970) (amended 1972).
However, as with most compensation acts, the LHCA also expressly preserved
an injured employee's right to bring a tort action against any third party who might
potentially be liable in regard to the accident. See 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1970) (amended
1972). This provision, innocuous enough in a typical shore-based employment
situation, proved to have a different effect when applied to the longshoring industry.
Indeed longshoremen
regularly work on premises (i.e., ships) owned by third parties (shipowners) which
are temporarily relinquished to the employers (master stevedore) for the carrying
out of... loading and unloading operations. Thus, the situation of employment-
related injuries attributable to the acts of third parties (not employers) ... is the
order of the day in maritime employment.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, § 6-46, at 410.
Historically, the shipowner's duty was simply to provide a ship that was
seaworthy to those seamen in his employ. However, in the 1940's and '50's the
Supreme Court substantially rewrote the law in this area. First, the Court
transformed the shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy ship into a form of strict
liability. See, e.g., Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). Second, the Court
ruled that an unseaworthiness claim could be brought against the owner of the vessel
not only by an actual seaman, but also by a longshoreman working on the ship in
loading and unloading operations. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85
(1946). Finally, in 1956, the Court ruled that a shipowner who was required to pay a
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substantially revised the 1927 Act in 1972.67 Of particular importance to the
subject of this Comment was Congress' revision of section 903, the
"coverage" provision of the Act. As before, the employee's injury must occur
on the "navigable waters" of the United States; a maritime "situs" must be
present. However, the boundaries of this "situs" have been dramatically
broadened. "Navigable waters" now includes "any adjoining pier, wharf,
drydock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or
building a vessel." 68 Therefore, in a most explicit fashion, Congress has
legislatively overruled the Nacirema decision and moved the coverage of the
LHCA landward of the Jensen line.
69
Under the amended Act, an injured claimant still must qualify as an
"employee" before he is entitled to federal benefits. However, in contrast to
the 1927 LHCA, the term "employee" is no longer defined by reference to the
activities performed by the claimant's employer. Instead, the amended Act
requires the claimant himself to be a "person engaged in maritime
employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in
longshoring operations" ' 70 before he merits the designation of "employee."
The clear implication of this status requirement is that the claimant must
have some personal connection, by virtue of the functions he performs, with
the work of the sea.
Accordingly, the Act now contains two requirements for the assertion of
federal power over employment-related death and injury in the maritime
damage award as a result of a successful unseaworthiness suit by a longshoreman
could seek indemnity from the longshoreman's employer, the stevedore, on the theory
that the stevedore had breached his express and/or implied warranty of workmanlike
performance to the shipowner. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,
350 U.S. 124 (1956).
The net effect of these decisions was to render the stevedore liable to any of
his injured employees for a substantial tort claim. As a result, § 905 of the 1927 Act,
which stated that the employer's liability to his employee was exclusively that
prescribed by the Act, became meaningless. Insurance costs for stevedores skyrock-
eted, and litigation expenses for both employers and employees mounted steadily. See
S. REP., supra note 65, at 9. In addition, federal district court dockets in many areas
became jammed with longshoremen's unseaworthiness actions. Id.
To counter these problems the 1972 amendments to the LHCA, in effect,
legislatively overruled Sieracki and Ryan. A longshoreman may now sue a third party
for negligence but not for unseaworthiness; and the stevedore is no longer liable in
any fashion to the third party who is the subject of the suit. See 33 U.S.C. § 905(b)
(Supp. V 1975).
67. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970) as amended by Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L No. 92-
-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (Supp. V 1975)). See
generally Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act -
After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MAi L & COM. 1 (1974); Comment, Broadened
Coverage Under The LHWCA, 33 LA. L. REV. 683 (1973); Note, Maritime Jurisdiction
and Longshoremen's Remedies, 1973 WASH. U.LQ. 649 (1973); 4 RuT. - CAm. L J.
404 (1973); 47 TuL. L REV. 1151 (1973).
68. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp. V 1975).
69. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, § 6-50, at 424.
70. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (Supp. V 1975).
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industry - situs and status. The application of the status criterion has
already generated considerable difficulty. Indeed, the task of determining
which shore-based employees in a modern, diversified port facility are
engaged in "maritime employment" has proven to be a vexing one to the
federal courts. Since this question is now before the Supreme Court, it is
particularly critical to examine how the lower federal courts have construed
this term in order to evaluate the possible resolutions.
THE "POINT OF REST" ANALYSIS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the
problem of defining "maritime employment" in I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits
Review Board,71 a consolidated appeal involving three employees who
incurred injuries on the land while performing various tasks in the ports of
Baltimore, Maryland and Norfolk, Virginia. The first claimant, Adkins, was
a forklift operator in a warehouse located at the Dundalk Marine Terminal
in the Port of Baltimore. On March 2, 1973, a load of brass tubing, packed in
a container, arrived at the terminal aboard the S.S. American Legend. At
that time, the container was removed from the ship, placed on a chassis, and
trucked approximately three-quarters of a mile from the ship's side to a
marshaling yard. The American Legend, which was able to fully discharge
its cargo in a single day, sailed from Baltimore the same day it arrived. The
container, however, remained in storage at the marshaling yard until March
5, when it was moved to the warehouse where Adkins was assigned. There,
the container was "stripped," that is, unloaded, and the tubing itself placed
in storage. Four days later, while moving the load of tubing from its storage
place in the warehouse to a loading area where a delivery truck waited to
transfer the tubing to its final inland destination, Adkins suffered back and
leg injuries.72
The second claimant, Brown, also a forklift operator, worked in a
terminal warehouse in Norfolk, Virginia. When goods destined for eventual
shipment by water arrived at the terminal either by truck or rail, they were
stored in specified areas in the warehouse where Brown worked. It was
Brown's function to move these items from their storage areas to other
locations within the warehouse where empty containers stood waiting. At
that point, other employees would take the individual items of cargo
delivered by Brown and "stuff," that is, load the containers with them. 73
While engaged in his duties, Brown suffered carbon monoxide poisoning.
71. 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated, 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc),
petitions for cert. filed, 45 U.S.LW. 3401 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1976) (No. 76-706), 45 U.S.L.W.
3417 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1976) (No. 76-730).
72. Brief of the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Program at 9-11, I.T.O.
Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated, 542 F.2d 903 (4th
Cir. 1976) (en banc), petitions for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1976) (No.
76-706), 45 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1976) (No. 76-730).
73. 529 F.2d 1080, 1082 (4th Cir. 1975). When fully loaded the container would
then be moved by a vehicle called a "hustler" to one of two areas. If the container
would not be loaded aboard a vessel for some period of time, it would be stored in a
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The third claimant, Harris, performed the function which sequentially
followed that performed by Brown. He operated a small truck-like vehicle
called a "hustler," with which he moved previously stuffed containers from
the long-term container storage area to the container marshaling area
located near the pier. Later in the day, when the designated ship finally
arrived at the pier, the containers would actually be loaded aboard the
vessel. While moving containers, the brakes on Harris' hustler failed and he
was injured in a collision with a parked container.7 4
Adkins, Brown, and Harris all filed claims for benefits under the
amended LHCA. In each instance, their employers unsuccessfully fought the
claims at two separate administrative levels. 75 The employers then filed
appeals with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.76 In
deciding the issue, the court first observed that all three claimants clearly
met the situs requirement of the amended Act.7 7 In addition, the court found
that at the time of their respective injuries, each employee was clearly
performing a function within the "overall process" of loading and unloading
a ship.78 However, the court was unable to determine, from the words of the
Act itself, whether employees performing such land-based tasks in the
"overall" loading/unloading process were truly engaged in "maritime
employment" so as to satisfy section 902(3) of the Act. The Fourth Circuit
finally resolved this problem by ruling that all longshoremen injured while
unloading or loading cargo in the area between the vessel and the first or
last land-based cargo storage or holding area ("point of rest") were engaged
in "maritime employment" and thereby covered by the federal act. 79 Since
Adkins, Brown, and Harris were all injured landward of the "point of rest,"
they were entitled solely to state workmen's compensation benefits.80
"long-term container storage yard." If actual shipboard loading was more immediate,
the container would be taken to a "marshaling area" adjacent to the pier for short-
term storage. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Harris v. Maritime Terminals, Inc., 1 BENEFITS REV. BD. SERV. 301 (1975);
Brown v. Maritime Terminals, Inc., 1 BENEFrs REV. BD. SERV. 212 (1974); Adkins v.
I.T.O. Corp., 1 BENEFITS REV. BD. SERV. 199 (1974). If an employer contests a claim
filed under the LHCA by an injured employee, a hearing is conducted by an
administrative law judge to resolve the issue. 33 U.S.C. § 919 (1970) (Supp. V 1975).
Appeals from such decisions are then heard by the Benefits Review Board (BRB), an
independent three member reviewing panel within the Department of Labor. 33 U.S.C.
§ 921(b) (Supp. V 1975).
76. Any party may appeal a decision of the BRB to the United States Court of
Appeals for the circuit in which the claimant's injury occurred. 33 U.S.C. §921(c)
(Supp. V 1975).
77. 529 F.2d at 1083-84.
78. Id. at 1081. The court, in using the phrase "overall process," was apparently
referring to the broad perspective view which can be taken of the loading/unloading
process. Such a view would conceive the loading/unloading process as including all
cargo-handling tasks taking place between the "ship and the point of discharge to the
consignee or point of receipt from the shipper." Id. See note 121 infra.
79. Id. at 1087.
80. The "point of rest" doctrine enunciated in the opinion of Judge Winter, with
Judge Craven, dissenting, was subsequently reheard en banc by six judges. 542 F.2d
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The majority opinion, written by Judge -Winter, took a standard
approach to interpreting the statute. First, the court noted that the Act itself,
other than stating that "maritime employment" included "any longshore-
man or other person engaged in longshoring operations,"8' was totally silent
on the matter of coverage. 2 Then the court made a brief sojourn into the
preamendment cases and administrative regulations. The court concluded
that the cases were of minimal assistance in defining the words of section
902(3),s 3 while the administrative regulations provided only limited
authority on the meaning of the phrase "longshoring operations.' 84
Therefore, the court turned to an examination of "the legislative history of
the 1972 Amendments and ... the context in which they were enacted" for
further illumination.85
The court first undertook a brief examination of the forty-seven year
history of the LHCA. The majority observed that the Nacirema decision was
the seminal case for understanding the extended coverage provisions of the
amended Act.88 According to this view, the amendments represented a direct
response to the Nacirema Court's suggestion that Congress could cure the
anomalies of coverage under the 1927 Act. Thus, a basic goal of Congress in
passing the amendments was to afford longshoremen injured landward of
903 (4th Cir. 1976). The en banc opinion substantially modified the result of the panel
decision. See note 98 infra. Adkins was again denied federal benefits, but Harris and
Brown were granted LHCA coverage. While the "point of rest" doctrine is therefore of
indeterminate validity in the only circuit which has accepted the theory, it cannot be
lightly dismissed. Indeed, it represents the central theory the longshoring industry
will argue before the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 34-37, I.T.O.
v. Blundo, cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1976) (No. 76-454). The "point of rest" analysis
was also advocated in a dissenting opinion written in the Second Circuit decision
which rejected the "point of rest" theory. See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v.
Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 57 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, J., concurring and dissenting);
note 126 infra.
For discussion of the Fourth Circuit three judge panel opinion in I.T.O. Corp.
v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), see 54 N.C.L REV. 925 (1976); 8
ST. MARY's L.J. 210 (1976); and 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1179 (1976).
81. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (Supp. V 1975).
82. 529 F.2d at 1083.
83. The case law, said the court, "shed[s] no real light on how far shoreward the
maritime nature of loading and unloading extends"; those cases had '"imited recovery
to injuries sustained on the seaward side of the water's edge because such was the
limit of admiralty jurisdiction." Id. at 1084.
84. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, in regulations designed
to increase safety in the longshoring industry, promulgated the following definition:
"[tihe term 'longshoring operations' means the loading, unloading, moving or
handling of cargo, ship's stores, gear, etc., into, in, on, or out of any vessel on the
navigable waters of the United States." 29 C.F.R. § 1918.3(i) (1974). The court viewed
the regulations as an indication of the narrow meaning of the term "longshoring
operations" at the time the 1972 amendments were passed. Nevertheless, the court
conceded that because the regulations were drafted prior to the 1972 amendment, they
could very well be redrafted at a later time to cover a broader range of shore-based
employees. 529 F.2d at 1084.
85. 529 F.2d at 1085.
86. Id. at 1086.
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the Jensen line the opportunity to file for federal benefits. The only problem
was to decide how far landward of the Jensen line Congress had wanted to
extend coverage.
In the Senate Committee Report on the amendments, the court found
what it considered to be persuasive evidence explaining Congress' purpose
in extending the coverage of the Act.8 7 The committee began its discussion
of coverage by stating that, in general, the 1972 amendments were designed
to cover those employees "who would otherwise be covered by this Act [the
1927 LHCA] for part of their activity."88 Then, the committee illustrated the
meaning of this general assertion by describing, with some precision, the
types of employees it envisioned as either eligible or ineligible for federal
coverage.8 9 The court briefly examined all of the committee's examples of
covered and noncovered employees. However, the court apparently accorded
substantial weight to two examples in particular. First, the committee stated
that longshoremen who unload cargo from a ship and transport it
"immediately ... to a storage or holding area on the pier, wharf, or
terminal adjoining navigable waters" are covered under the federal Act.9
The court, focusing on the word "immediately," inferred from this statement
that those longshoremen who handle cargo shoreward of the "storage or
holding area" where cargo is "immediately" transported were thereby
excluded from coverage under the LHCA.91 Then the court turned to the
second example, which stated that "employees whose responsibility is only
to pick up stored cargo for further transshipment" were not eligible for
federal benefits.92 The court apparently understood this to refer to those
87. The House and Senate Reports contain virtually identical discussions of the
extended coverage provisions of the 1972 amendments. Compare S. REP., supra note
65, at 12-13 with HousE COMM. ON EDUCATION, AND LABOR, LONGSHOREMEN'S AND
HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, H. REP. No. 1441, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972). [Hereinafter cited as H. REP.].
88. 529 F.2d at 1085 (quoting S. REP., supra note 65, at i3).
89. The Committee stated:
To take a typical example, cargo, whether in break bulk or containerized form, is
typically unloaded from the ship and immediately transported to a storage or
holding area on the pier, wharf, or terminal adjoining navigable waters. The
employees who perform this work would be covered under the bill for injuries
sustained by them over the navigable waters or on the adjoining land area. The
Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not engaged in loading,
unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just because they are injured in an area
adjoining navigable waters used for such activity. Thus, employees whose
responsibility is only to pick up stored cargo for further trans-shipment would not
be covered, nor would purely clerical employees whose jobs do not require them to
participate in the loading or unloading of cargo. However, checkers, for example,
who are directly involved in the loading and unloading functions are covered by
the new amendment.
S. REP., supra note 65, at 13.
906. 529 F.2d at 1087 (quoting S. REP., supra note 65, at 13).
91. Id. at 1088.
92. Id. at 1087.
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employees who move about or lift cargo which has been stored in the
terminal but which is destined for eventual transshipment.93
With these examples in mind, and using only the briefest of explanation
and reasoning, the court abruptly announced that the committee's examples
of covered and noncovered employees exposed a clearly discernible pattern.
They demonstrated that the committee intended the coverage of the
amended Act to the defined with reference to the "point of rest" - a concept
of industry-wide usage that was equally applicable in both loading and
unloading situations.94 When unloading, the point of rest was that point "on
the pier, wharf, or terminal adjoining navigable waters" where cargo is first
stored or held (brought to "rest") after it leaves the ship.95 When loading, it
is that point "on the pier, wharf, or terminal adjoining navigable waters"
where the cargo is last stored or held prior to actual shipboard loading.96
The court ruled that when cargo is between the ship and the first or last
points of rest, those employees handling such cargo are engaged in
"maritime employment. ' 97 When cargo is handled landward of this point,
the maritime nature of the work disappears, as does the coverage of the
federal Act.98
93. Id. at 1088.
94. The court apparently relied on two preamendment sources to define the "point
of rest." Id. at 1087. The first source described the "point of rest" as "a point within a
terminal where the terminal operator designates that cargo or equipment be placed for
movement to or from a vessel." Id. at 1095 (Craven, J., dissenting) (quoting Norfolk
Marine Terminal Association Tariff (Item 290)). The second source, employing a
similar definition, said the "point of rest" was
that area on the Terminal facility which is assigned for the receipt of inbound
cargo from the ship and from which inbound cargo may be delivered to the
consignee, and that area which is assigned for the receipt of outbound cargo from
shippers for vessel loading.
Id. at 1096 (Craven, J., dissenting) (quoting 46 C.F.R. § 533.6(c) (1976)).
Both of these sources refer to the point at which a marine terminal operator
can assess charges against the vessel for performing various services. In the vessel
unloading situation, the terminal cargo handling operation does not begin (and the
terminal operator cannot collect fees for performing cargo handling services) until the
cargo either has passed beyond the "point of rest" or has remained at the "point of
rest" beyond a certain length of time. Similarly, when cargo is outbound, the terminal
operator can assess charges only as long as the cargo is landward of the "point of
rest." In essence, the "point of rest" defines the time at which the respective duties of
the stevedore and marine terminal operator begin and end. See 46 C.F.R. § 533 (1976).
It is important to note that the point of rest is neither the point where cargo
first touches ground when it is unloaded from a ship by the ship's tackle, nor the point
where cargo last touches the ground before the ship's tackle hoists cargo aboard the
vessel. Instead, it refers to the holding area located away from the side of the ship
where cargo is assembled for short-term storage.
95. 529 F.2d at 1087.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1088.
98. Judge Craven, in a lengthy dissent, argued that the point of rest doctrine was
incorrect. In particular, he observed that the point of rest doctrine is not mentioned
explicitly in either the statute or the committee report. The majority, therefore, had
"no license to find in a statute words which the Congress did not put there." Id. at
19771
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THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE/UNIFORM COVERAGE ANALYSIS
The difficult task of defining "maritime employment" came before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Pittcton
Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura,99 a consolidated appeal involving two
land-based workers' 00 injured in the Port of New York. The first claimant,
Blundo, sustained an injury when he slipped on a patch of ice at the pier
where he was working.10 ' At the time of his accident, Blundo was
"checking"' 1 2 cargo being stripped from a container. The container,
unloaded from a vessel several days earlier in a different part of the harbor,
had been trucked over city streets to the pier where Blundo was assigned.10 3
1096. As a result, Judge Craven urged that the theories advanced by the Benefit
Review Board, see, e.g., Avvento v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 1 BENEFITS REV. BD. SERV.
174 (1974), be affirmed by the court. Under the BRB's analysis, Adkins, Harris, and
Brown would be covered by. the amended Act because they were engaged in the
continuous process of loading and unloading cargo in maritime commerce: a process
that begins when goods are delivered to the terminal building for maritime transport
and which ends only when those goods are taken from the terminal for final inland
transport. 529 F.2d at 1092-93.
After the three judge panel "point of rest" opinion was issued, the Fourth
Circuit reheard the I.T.O. case en banc. 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc),
petitions for cert. filed, 95 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1976) (No. 76-706), 45 U.S.L.W.
3417 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1976) (No. 76-730). The en banc opinion substantially altered the
results of the first decision. Judges Winter and Haynsworth continued to subscribe to
the point of rest doctrine. They were joined by Judge Russell. Judges Craven and
Butzner sided with the former's dissenting panel opinion. As a result, Judge Widener
became the deciding vote. His theory, expressed solely in the opinion of Judge Winter,
was that employees moving goods in the terminal for mere convenience or
transshipment purposes, are not covered by the LHCA. However, when they move
cargo in the terminal during the overall process of loading or unloading a ship, they
are entitled to LHCA benefits. In conformity with this thinking, Judge Widener sided
with the three "point of rest" adherents in the Adkins case. Adkins was denied federal
benefits in the resulting four-to-two vote. In contrast, Widener sided with the
dissenters in the cases of Harris and Brown, and their awards were upheld in the
resulting three-to-three deadlock.
99. 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Northeast Marine Terminal Co.
v. Caputo, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1976) (Nos. 76-444, 454).
100. The consolidated appeal originally involved four individual workers. How-
ever, the employers' appeals in two cases were dismissed at the outset for procedural
reasons. Id. at 42-46.
101. Id. at 41.
102. When a container carrying goods destined for several consignees is being
"stripped," a "checker" is present to verify the contents of the container against the
bill of lading. Id. at 41 n.4. However, whether cargo is being shipped by container or
otherwise, the "checker" plays a vital role in the cargo handling process at a marine
terminal. The "checker" records the condition in which cargo arrives at the terminal
prior to maritime shipment. He also ascertains the condition of cargo that has been
discharged from a vessel for subsequent land transit. In this way, the maritime
carrier's responsibility for cargo damage or loss is immediately and accurately
determined. See L KENDALL, THE BUSINESS OF SHIPPING 68, 78 (1973).
103. 544 F.2d at 41.
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The second claimant, Caputo, was injured while rolling a dolly loaded with
cheese out of the terminal warehouse into a consignee's truck.104 The cheese
had been unloaded from a vessel at least five days prior to the accident.10 5
The Second Circuit, per Judge Friendly, ruled that both Caputo and
Blundo met the situs requirement of the amended Act. 106 However, the court
encountered difficulty in applying the status requirement. The court
observed that the Act itself failed to define either "engaged in maritime
employment," or "longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring
operations."'10 7 In addition, the court stated that definitions of these words
used in other contexts prior to the amendments were of minimal value in
assessing what Congress may have meant when it enacted the amendments
in 1972.108 Therefore, an extensive analysis of the legislative history was
necessary. 09 As a result of that analysis, the court held that the amended
Act, at a minimum,
cover[s] all persons meeting the situs requirements (1) who are engaged
in stripping or stuffing containers or (2) are engaged in the handling of
cargo up to the point where the consignor [sic, consignee] has actually
begun its movement from the pier (or in the case of loading, from the
time when the consignor has stopped his vehicle at the pier), provided in
the latter instances that the employee has spent a significant part of his
time in the typical longshoring activity of taking cargo on or off a
vessel."10
104. Id. at 42.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 51. The question whether Blundo met the situs requirement of the Act
was contested at the hearing before the administrative law judge. Id. at 51 n.19.
107. Id. at 41.
108. Id. at 50-51.
109. Prior to its examination of the legislative history, the court rejected a number
of possible methods by which to analyze the words of § 902(3). The court stated that
the language of § 920 of the Act, to the effect that coverage should be presumed for
any claim filed under the Act, was simply not "helpful" when the dispute involved an
issue as crucial as the proper interpretation of the statute's language. Id. at 48. But see
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 541 (5th Cir. 1976), petitions for
cert. filed, 45 U.S.LW. 3364 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1976) (No. 76-641), 45 U.S.LW. 3450 (U.S.
Dec. 27, 1976) (No. 76-880).
Similar reasoning applied, said the court, to the suggestion that the various
courts of appeals should defer to the decisions made by the administrative agency
charged with the responsibility of applying the statute, the Benefits Review Board. In
the area of statutory interpretation, the court asserted that its competence was simply
superior.to that of the BRB. 544 F.2d at 48-50. But see Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v.
Perdue, 539 F.2d at 541. It should be noted that the Second Circuit had little
confidence in the opinions of the BRB. The court harshly criticized the BRB for
rendering conclusory decisions which gave minimal information on the nature of the
longshoring industry. 544 F.2d at 47.
Finally, the Second Circuit ruled that while the oft-cited principle that
"remedial legislation should be construed liberally" was helpful, it was by no means
of decisive importance. Id. at 51. But see Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539
F.2d at 541.
110. 544 F.2d at 56.
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On the basis of this holding, the court ruled that Blundo and Caputo met the
status requirement and were therefore covered by the Act.
Obviously, the Second and Fourth Circuits had distinctly different
appraisals of the legislative history of the 1972 amendments. Yet the Second
Circuit found that more than a mere difference of interpretation separated
the two courts. Indeed, the Second Circuit stated that the legislative history
clearly precluded the use of the "point of rest" doctrine.1 11 The keystone in
the court's analysis was its observation that the congressional committee
reports had treated the language of section 902(3) of the amended Act in a
disjunctive fashion. 112 For whatever reasons, Congress had "perceived a
need to provide expressly for coverage for 'any longshoreman' in addition to
what it established for a person engaged in 'longshoring operations.' "113 The
court concluded that the actual words of section 902(3) had to be read in the
same disjunctive manner found in the committee reports.
Under such an interpretation, a longshoreman would be covered by the
Act (assuming he met its other requirements) even though he was not
engaged in "longshoring operations." This result, said the court, clearly
condemned the "point of rest" doctrine because, almost by definition, any
person moving cargo between a ship and the first or last points of rest was
engaged in "longshoring operations." If the point of rest doctrine were
correct, then only a desire by Congress to be redundant could explain why
that body also provided coverage for "any longshoreman."' 14
The court then set out to explain Congress' express coverage of both
"any longshoreman" and any "person engaged in longshoring opera-
tions."115 The committee reports, said the court, demonstrated that Congress
was concerned with the problems brought about by containerization and
other modern cargo-handling methods. In particular, the reports revealed a
congressional awareness that "new facts of life on the waterfront... mean
that a good deal more of the longshoreman's traditional jobs are now
performed on shore."1 16 Therefore, the court concluded that Congress
111. Id. at 52.
112. The court was referring to the statement in the committee report which said:
"[aiccordingly, the bill would amend the act to provide coverage of longshoremen,
harbor workers, ship repairmen, ship builders, shipbreakers, and other employees
engaged in maritime employment." Id. (quoting S. REP., supra note 65, at 13)
(emphasis added).
113. Id. (emphasis added). Under the Second Circuit's interpretation, § 902(3)
would state: The term "employee" means "any person engaged in maritime
employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring
activity or engaged in other maritime employment." Id.
114. Id.
115. The court rejected the argument that "any longshoreman" meant, literally,
"any longshoreman." "Obviously it is not enough that a claimant calls himself a
longshoreman or that a longshoreman's union in a particular port has forced
employers to hire its members for such unlongshoreman-like positions as clerks or
guards." Id. Accord, Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d 264,
272 (1st Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1976) (No. 76-
571).
116. 544 F.2d at 53.
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undoubtedly considered these now shore-based activities to be the clear
"functional equivalent[s]" of those tasks performed by longshoremen in
precontainerized days aboard or alongside the vessel. 17 In other words,
although the tasks involved in handling containerized cargo might seem
different from those typically carried out by longshoremen in the past,
Congress nonetheless considered these activities to be "longshoring
operations." Curiously, the court's analysis stopped at this point; no attempt
was made to relate these observations to Congress' reasons for extending
coverage to both "any longshoreman" and any "person engaged in
longshoring operations." 118
Nevertheless, this interpretation produced a clear outcome in terms of
claimant Blundo, who was injured while assisting in the "stripping" of a
container. The court concluded that in enacting the amendments in 1972, it
had been Congress' goal to cover employees performing activities which
were "functionally equivalent" to traditional longshoring activities, so long
as they met the Act's situs test." 9 According to the court's analysis,
"stuffing" and "stripping" were certainly within the coverage of the 1972
amendments. Therefore, the award of LHCA benefits to Blundo was
correct. 20 Unfortunately, the court offered no criteria for determining
whether a given task is or is not "functionally equivalent." Instead, the
court merely stated that "stuffing" and "stripping" containers are the
"functional equivalents" of the longshoreman's time honored tasks of
stowing cargo into the ship's hold and sorting cargo as it is unloaded from
the ship.121
The committee report, said the court, also gave a second explanation for
the use of the term "any longshoreman" in section 902(3) of the Act. In
enacting the amendments, Congress wanted "to permit a uniform compensa-
117. Id.
118. Although the court failed to discuss Congress' reasons for expressly covering
both groups, a possible explanation is available. By using the phrase "any
longshoreman," Congress perhaps hoped to ensure that an injured longshoreman
would still be covered by the LHCA, even if the courts did not agree with Congress
that land-based tasks now performed by longshoremen were "functionally equival-
ent" to "longshoring operations."
119. Id.
120. 544 F.2d at 56.
121. Id. It should be noted that the functional equivalence analysis demands an
expansive concept of the process of loading and unloading a vessel. The Second
Circuit said that such a view would recognize that the loading and unloading of a
vessel "does not stop as soon as the cargo first hits the pier on being removed from a
vessel, nor does it begin only when the cargo stands on the pier next to the vessel on
which it is about to be loaded." Id. at 53 n.21. Instead, the loading process would begin
with the receipt of cargo from the consignor, and the unloading process would end
with the delivery of cargo to the consignee.
In light of the Second Circuit's apparent perception of the "narrow view" of
loading and unloeding, the question arises whether the court fully understood the
location of the "point of rest." The point of rest is not the place where "cargo hits the
pier on being removed from the vessel." See note 94 supra. Yet, the court seems to




tion system to apply to employees who would otherwise be covered by this
Act for part of their activity."122 In contrast to the Fourth Circuit, the
Second Circuit determined that this language revealed broader congres-
sional intentions than merely remedying the evils brought about by
Nacirema. Indeed, this congressional
concern for uniformity was not limited to rectifying the disparity
between the longshoreman making up the draft on the ship and the
longshoreman receiving it on the pier [that is, Nacirema]; it extended to
the disparity that would result if a line were drawn between the latter
and a longshoreman, perhaps the very same one, who moved the
unloaded cargo to another place on the pier.
123
The court, stressing the words "uniform coverage," therefore concluded that
Caputo, and employees like him, would be covered by the amended Act when
loading cargo into or unloading cargo from the vehicles of consignees or
consignors. To be eligible for coverage, the employee need only meet three
qualifications: that he not come under one of the express exceptions found in
the committee report;12 ' that, in the past, he had "spen[t] a significant part
of his time in the typical longshoring activity of taking cargo on or off a
vessel"; 125 and that his injury took place in a permissible situs.12 6
THE "INTEGRAL PROCESS" ANALYSIS
The third and final theory for defining "maritime employment" was
advanced by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue.127 The court, adopting the broadest
interpretation to date of the 1972 amendments, ruled that any employee who
participated in "an integral part of the process of moving maritime cargo
from a ship to land transportation" or vice-versa was covered by the Act. 128
122. Id. at 54 (quoting S. REP., supra note 65, at 13).
123. Id.
124. Id. For the list of Congress' express exceptions, see note 89 supra.
125. Id. at 56. The court apparently added this proviso in response to the
"otherwise... covered by this Act for part of their activity" language found in the
committee report. The court left the issue whether this proviso was "essential" to be
decided in a future decision. Id. For further discussion of this proviso, see text
accompanying notes 168 to 170 infra and Addendum.
126. 544 F.2d at 56. Judge Lumbard, in a dissenting opinion contended that the
Fourth Circuit's "point of rest" rule was "easier to apply" and "more in keeping with
the realities of maritime employment" than the tests adopted by the majority opinion.
Id. at 57. In Stockman v, John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 275-77
(1st Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.LW. 3332 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1976) (No. 76-
571), the First Circuit expressly rejected the point of rest doctrine and adopted, in
large part, the reasoning of the Second Circuit.
127. 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), petitions for cert. filed, 45 U.S.LW. 3364 (U.S.
Nov. 8, 1976) (No. 76-641), 45 U.S.L.W. 3450 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1976) (No. 76-880).
128. Id. at 543.
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In Jacksonville, a consolidated appeal, two employees 129 were injured
while performing cargo handling tasks. The first claimant, Ford, was
injured in Beaumont, Texas while loading a military vehicle onto a railroad
flat car for subsequent inland transport. 130 The vehicle had been discharged
from a vessel and stored at the pier for a minimum of two days prior to the
accident. The second claimant, Bryant, was working as a "cotton header" in
a warehouse located adjacent to a pier in Galveston, Texas.13 l Bryant's job
was to store loads of cotton received from warehouses located further inland.
The cotton would remain stored in Bryant's warehouse for approximately
one week; members of the longshoremen's union local1 32 would then arrive to
transfer the cotton to a waiting vessel.
In a remarkably brief analysis of the committee reports, the court noted
that Congress definitely desired to cover those employees who load or
unload a vessel. The court then observed that Congress also extended
coverage to certain employees, in particular, "checkers," when they were
"directly involved in the loading or unloading functions."'133 Although this
language referred ohly to checkers, the court asserted that the statement
indicated a more general intent on the part of Congress - to cover
employees not only while loading or unloading vessels, but also while
"directly involved" in loading or unloading tasks. 134 The court, by
implication, indicated that the test for direct involvement was satisfied if the
injured employee was performing work which was "an integral part of the
process" of cargo movement between land and water transport. 3 5 Applying
this analysis, the court concluded that both Bryant and Ford were covered
by the amended Act.136
129. Jacksonville actually involved five consolidated cases. Id. at 536. The three
cases involving employees not engaged in cargo handling activities will not be
discussed in this Comment.
130. Id. at 543.
131. Id. at 544.
132. The "cotton headers," who handled cotton solely in the warehouse, had their
own individual union local. The longshoremen's local was a separate organization. Id.
133. Id. at 539 (quoting H. REP., supra note 87, at 11) (emphasis supplied by court).
134. Id. at 539-40.
135. Id. at 543, 544. The court expressly rejected the "point of rest" doctrine, on the
theory that the two examples of covered and noncovered employees found in the
committee reports, and relied on by the Fourth Circuit, were not of decisive weight.
"In our opinion, these remarks establish no more than that workers who bring cargo
to a storage area from on board ship are covered, while those persons (generally
truckers or railroad personnel) who merely receive and transport it inland are not
covered." Id. at 540.
136. Id. at 543, 544. The Third Circuit, in Sea-Land Serv. Inc. v. Director, 540 F.2d
629 (3d Cir. 1976) also took a broad view of the Act, but for entirely different reasons.
The court held that Congress, in enacting the 1972 amendments, exercised its full
legislative jurisdiction in admiralty. Id. at 638. As a result, LHCA coverage is
available, regardless of situs, to all those who handle cargo after it leaves land
transportation (prior to vessel loading) or before it leaves maritime transport for
subsequent rail or truck carriage. Id. However, this theory is unlikely to find favor.
Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly rejected a similar contention made with regard




The decisions of the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuit Courts of
Appeals, as well as those of the other circuits, represent fairly standard
efforts at statutory construction. However, in light of Congress' distressing
failure to produce even a reasonably clear longshoremen's statute in 1972, it
is doubtful whether such efforts can produce conclusions that are truly
dispositive. Indeed, the courts of appeals reached widely varying conclu-
sions largely because of the small amount of decidedly ambiguous language
found in the committee reports and the statute itself. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the opinions seem vaguely unsatisfying, as if they merely skirted
the issue. Indeed, the highly conclusory nature of the Fourth and Fifth
Circuit opinions, when combined with the Second Circuit's admitted
ignorance about loading and unloading operations in a modem port,137 gives
the impression that the courts had only a vague understanding of the
maritime industry. Whether this is true or not, all three opinions failed to
reconcile the highly specialized nature of cargo handling in a modem port
with the words of the statute and the congressional committees. A short
analysis of the organization of the waterfront and the functions performed
there is therefore in order.
Court reasoned that defining the coverage of the 1927 Act with reference to the ever
changing judicial interpretations of the limits of admiralty jurisdiction would leave
the Act's coverage confused and uncertain. Id. at 223. Even more importantly, such a
theory would mean "'that every litigation raising an issue of federal coverage would
raise an issue of constitutional dimensions, with all that that implies,...."' Id. at 221
(quoting Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 126 (1962)). This analysis seems
equally pertinent to the amended Act.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's view of § 902(3) should be briefly noted. In
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 179
(1976), the court ruled that the basic criterion for ascertaining "status" was whether
the injured employee had a "realistically significant realtionship with 'traditional
maritime activity involving navigation and commerce on navigable waters."' Id. at
961. The court held that the claimant, who was injured when he fell off a floating
walkway while sorting and feeding logs into a mill for processing, did not meet this
test. As this opinion did not involve longshoremen or longshoring operations, it is of
limited relevance to this Comment.
Of course, there are other sources of interpretation of the amended Act's
status requirements besides the courts. In particular, the noted commentators Gilmore
and Black have discussed the issue. They largely dismissed the language of the
committee reports and concluded that the statute itself
can reasonably be read to mean that all persons who suffer employment-related
injuries within the Act's expanded territorial limits are covered, provided only
that they are employed by an employer "any of whose employees are employed in
maritime employment [of the types specified], in whole or in part."
GiLMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, § 6-51, at 429. This is the broadest view of §§ 902(3)
and 903(a) advocated by any authority.
137. The court stated that it had an extensive number of questions about the
maritime industry. 544 F.2d at 47. Indeed, it censured the Benefits Review Board for
not developing a record that could answer these questions. Despite this lack of
knowledge concerning the maritime industry, the court proceeded to offer its opinion
on the proper construction of the amended act. Id.
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A port is a shore-based facility where cargo of varying types is placed
into or removed from water transportation. However, within such a facility,
there are strictly observed divisions of labor which have grown up through
expediency, governmental regulations, union agreements, and tradition.13s
In a typical modern port, cargo, whether import or export, is handled in a
two-stage operation with, in most cases, two distinct employers - the
marine terminal operator and the stevedore contractor. The stevedore
contractor is responsible for loading and unloading a ship. He performs this
function pursuant to a contract with the ship's owner, agent, or charter
operator. The stevedoring function, however, takes place solely between the
ship's hold and the point of rest on the pier, dock, or wharf. In contrast, all
cargo handling tasks performed landward of the point of rest are the
responsibility of the marine terminal operator or owner.13 9 In a number of
ports, "the stevedore, contractor and the marine terminal operator are
separate and unrelated entities. ' ' 14 0 In other ports, these two parties may be
corporately related, or even the same. Yet even when this occurs, "the
functions, duties and responsibilities of a contract stevedore and a marine
terminal operator remain the same as if there were no corporate relation-
ship."141
The stevedore and the terminal operator each hire different types of
labor to meet their specialized needs. However, in most instances, both
employers draw their labor from members of the longshoremen's union.
142
The stevedore hires what are known as "longshoremen gangs." 148 These are
groups of between fifteen and twenty-three longshoremen who hire
themselves out and work solely as a "gang" unit. They work between the
ship and the point of rest loading and unloading cargo into or from the
ship.144 In contrast, the men employed by the terminal operator to perform
the myriad of tasks in the terminal, while hired from the ranks of union
138. R. ORAM, CARGO HANDLING AND THE MODERN PORT 5 (1965).
139. THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STEVEDORES, THE STEVEDORE & MARINE
TERMINAL INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES, i-iv (1974). For example, with import
cargo, the stevedore places the cargo at the point of rest where either the consignee
himself takes delivery or the cargo undergoes further handling by the marine
terminal owner or operator. Similarly, with export cargo, the point of rest is where the
stevedore assumes control of cargo delivered by the shipper or the marine terminal
owner or operator for actual shipboard loading. Id. at iii.
It should be noted, however, that the point of rest is not a fixed geographic
location. It "may vary from terminal to terminal or between cargo types." Id. Thus the
point of rest separates functions, not locations on a pier. In any event, no matter
where the point of rest is "located," .the exchange of control and responsibilities
remains the same in all instances." Id.
140. Id. at iv.
141. Id.
142. KENDALL, supra note 102, at 92. On the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, the union is
the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA); on the Pacific coast, it is the
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU).
143. KENDALL, supra note 102, at 91.
144. For further discussion on the nature of a "gang," see text accompanying notes
149 to 154 infra.
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members, are not hired in gangs.145 Instead, they are hired individually for
such jobs as stripping, stuffing, and checking. These employees are not
designated as "longshoremen." Instead, they are known collectively as
"dock labor."'146
These facts suggest several interesting conclusions. First, the point of
rest is a clear, ascertained point within a given port. It is not an arbitrary
location. Indeed, it has performed a historic function in separating the
terminal operator from the stevedore and in indicating when the former
must begin or end his assessment of charges for cargo handling services. 147
Secondly, and most importantly, it is a point which can logically separate
federally-covered and state-covered employees. When the employee is
performing dock labor, he will be under state coverage; when he is
performing gang labor, he will receive federal coverage.
However, in analyzing the operation and structure of a contemporary
port facility, an understanding of other distinctions - in particular, the
multi-faceted nature of cargo is equally important. For example, items of
varying size and shape which are individually loaded on board and
separately stowed in the ship's hold are known as break bulk cargo. In
addition, there is "dry bulk cargo, such as wheat, and liquid bulk cargo such
as oil, both of which are simply poured into the hold. ' ' 148 Finally, there is
containerized cargo, which ordinarily consists of large metal boxes of
uniform size, loaded at a point distant from the pier with various items of
break bulk cargo. These distinctions are fundamental. Indeed, the type and
quantity of shoreside labor necessary to accomplish a given loading/unload-
ing assignment vary directly with the type of cargo involved.
In a break bulk cargo loading or unloading operation, the cargo is
handled by a longshoremen "gang" hired by the stevedore. Gangs have a
basic structure that, with minor variations, is found in most ports. 1 9 The
leader of the gang is the "foreman," who, in many ports, is the party hired
for work by the stevedore. 50 The foreman, in turn, is responsible for
reporting to work at the appropriate time and place accompanied by the
regular members of "his" gang. In essence, the foreman is the commander of
a core unit of men who, familiar with each other's work habits and trustful
of each other's skill in performing the dangerous work of transferring cargo
between pier and vessel, always choose to work together as a group.
While loading and unloading the ship, the gang members work in three
specific areas - the dock, the deck, and the hold of the ship. On the deck are
one or two "winch operators" or "winch drivers," who are chosen from the
145. KENDALL, supra note 102, at 92.
146. Id.
147. See note 94 aupra.
148. Goldberg, Containerization As A Force For Change On The Waterfront, 91
MONTHLY LAB. REv. Jan. 1968, at 8 n.7.
149. KENDALL, supra note 102, at 92. See also Marine Stevedoring Corp. v.
Oosting, 398 F.2d 900, 902 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nor., Nacirema Operating Co. v.
Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
150. KENDALL, supra note 102, at 93.
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members of the gang on the basis of their ability to work with the other
personnel stationed on deck.151 The operators control the winches, which lift
and transfer cargo between the hold and the pier. In turn, the winch
operators are highly dependent on the "signal man" or "hatchman.' 152
This person, also stationed on the deck, is the vital communication link
between the winchman and the other members of the gang working on the
shore or in the hold.
Located on the dock are approximately six to eight "piermen," who work
alongside the ship. In the loading process, they make up drafts of cargo for
subsequent transfer into the hold of the ship; during unloading, they guide
drafts of cargo to a safe landing on the pier and then distribute the
individual cargo packages to appropriate piles.153 The piermen's six to ten
counterparts on the ship, who perform similar activities in the ship's hold,
are appropriately called "holdmen."'1 54
Containerized cargo, when first introduced in the late 1950's, produced
little change in the above-described gang system.155 As most ships carried
both break bulk and containerized cargo, the demand for traditional gang
labor remained strong. However, it was not long before specially designed
container-only vessels began to ply the waters. This development brought
about two, analytically distinct, major changes in the traditional gang
system. First, when loading or unloading a container vessel, the number of
longshoremen required aboard the ship itself to accomplish the task was
substantially reduced. Whereas a traditional breakbulk gang required the
presence of between nine and thirteen men on the vessel (six to ten holdmen,
two winchmen, and one hatchman), the containerized gang required only
between six and eight (four to six holdmen and two hatchmen), 5 6 The men
displaced from the ship, along with the remainder of the gang, worked on
the shore, principally moving containers away from the side of the vessel by
truck and forklift to what is known as the "container marshalling yard" (the
"point of rest").157
Containerization, however, also brought a second change to the
traditional gang system - far fewer gangs were required to unload or load a
container ship. Whereas conventional vessels required between five and
seven separate gangs for the loading/unloading process, container ships
151. Id.
152. Id. For example, it is the signal man who signals the winch operator to cease
lowering cargo as it travels its final few feet to the landing point in the hold. As this
landing point is some fifty feet below the level of the deck, it is completely out of the
winchman's sight. Id. The gangwayman's task is therefore vital in avoiding both
human injury and cargo damage.
153. Id.
154. Id. Often there is also an additional "position" in the gang - the relief man.
The various members of the gang rotate into this position to rest.
155. Goldberg, supra note 148, at 8-9.
156. Brief for the Petitioner, at 17-18, I.T.O. v. Blundo, cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 522
(1976) (No. 76-454, 1976 Term).
157. Id. at 18.
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generally required only two.158 Thus, "[tlhe 100 men in gangs on
conventional ships, plus the additional labor needed for forklift operations
and checking, contrasts sharply with the 40 or so men used in cargo
handling on the container ship."159
Clearly, these two container-induced changes seriously threatened the
structure of work, level of employment, and strength of tht union on the
waterfront. 60 On the East Coast, at least, this resulted in a long series of
strikes which eventually produced an agreement in 1969 between the ILA
and the shipping industry, whereby
all consolidated [that is, loaded with goods destined for more than one
consignee] or less-than-truckload (LTL) containers owned or leased by
signatory employers which "either [come] from or [are] destined to any
point within a 50-mile radius from the center of any North Atlantic
District port shall be stuffed and stripped by ILA labor at longshore
rates in a waterfront facility .... ,,161
Thus as containerization has spread, the nature of the work performed by
the union's members has drastically changed. Under the work recapture
158. Goldberg, supra note 148, at 9.
159. Id. Another commentator, analyzing this situation, noted that:
Labor productivity is astonishingly increased by containerization. One major
shipping company reported that each of its work gangs on a conventional ship
produced an average of 15 tons per hour compared with 300 tons an hour worked
by one gang at a container ship hatch. More generally, the industry considers
that "it would take 126 men 84 hours each, or a total of 10,584 man-hours, to
discharge and load about 11,000 tons of cargo aboard a conventional ship. The
same amount of cargo on a container vessel can be handled by 42 men working 13
hours each or a total of 546 man-hours."
Ross, Waterfront Labor Response to Technological Change: A Tale of Two Unions, 21
LAB. L.J. 397, 400 (1970) (quoting The Sun (Baltimore), Mar. 28, 1969).
160. See generally Ross, supra note 159.
161. Id. at 407-08 (quoting "NYSA-ILA Settlement Terms," Jan. 12, 1969, p. 1).
The container clause was negotiated between the New York Shipping Association,
Inc. (NYSA) and the IL.k By 1970, the same clause was in effect in every Atlantic
Coast port from Boston, Massachusetts to Hampton Roads, Virginia. In large part,
union fears about the effect of "consolidating" companies led to adoption of the
"container clause." Such companies, using lower-priced non-ILA labor in off-pier
locations, accept small lots of cargo from various shippers and consolidate them into
full container loads. They then truck the containers to the pier for vessel loading.
Similarly, consolidators pick up containers loaded with cargo destined for different
consignees, strip the containers themselves, and deliver the cargo to its appropriate
final destination.
In 1973, the "container clause" was amended by the so-called "Dublin
supplement," which was an attempt by the union to strengthen its jurisdiction over
all stripping and stuffing of LTL containers passing through East Coast ports. See
International Longshoremen's Association; New York Shipping Association, Inc. and
Consolidated Express and Twin Express, Inc. 221 N.LIRB. 956, 964, 968-70 (1975).
These industry-union agreements on stuffing and stripping were recently held to
violate several provisions of the National abor Relations Act. ILA v. NLRB, 537 F.2d
706 (2d Cir. 1976) (enforcing 221 N.L.R.B. 956 (1975)), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 740 (1977),
noted in 90 HARv. L. REv. 815 (1977). In light of this decision, the continued
employment of members of the ILA in stripping and stuffing operations is
problematic.
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agreement described above, a far smaller percentage of the union's members
work on or alongside vessels. Instead, they work on the land, as dock labor,
performing stuffing and stripping activities in warehouses and terminals.
This analysis of the stevedoring and marine terminal industry clearly
reveals the nature of the issue presently before the Supreme Court. As shown
above, containerization put longshoremen "ashore" in great numbers, but
for two completely different reasons. Thus, when Congress extended the
coverage of the LHCA landward, was it concerned with the phenomenon of
fewer members of a longshoremen gang being aboard a ship during the
loading/unloading process? Or, in contrast, when the Congress stated that
"more of the longshoreman's work is performed on land than heretofore,"162
was it referring to the fact that as fewer gangs are needed per ship, more
longshoremen work ashore in terminals and warehouses pursuant to the
work recapture agreement signed in 1969? The evidence in the hearings and
the committee reports tends to support the conclusion that all the parties
involved in the 1972 amendments were apparently concerned solely with the
lack of uniform coverage for individual members of the longshore gang.
Several excerpts from the hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Labor
illustrate this fact. First, there is the following exchange:
Senator Javits: Lastly, Mr. Secretary, I understand that there is also
some controversy about work over land and work over water, and there
has been quite a good deal of litigation. Would you have any suggestion
as to how we could deal with that subject?
Secretary Hodgson [Secretary of Labor]: .. . I would like to see if Mr.
Schubert has any comments on that.
Mr. Schubert [Solicitor to the Department of Labor]:
Well, the latest case to draw a line was the Nascirema [sic] case, and it
drew the line between the ship and the plank and the land on which the
dock was located. It seems to me that it is inevitable that a line be
drawn somewhere. It is just a matter of judgment as to the most
appropriate geographical place.16 3
Both Senator Javits' question and Mr. Schubert'sanswer indicate they were
concerned primarily with the land/water anomaly brought about by
Nacirema and the effect it had on the longshoremen gang. In particular,
Senator Javits' question concerning 'litigation" could only refer to
Nacirema, for no litigation regarding terminal employees had taken place
under the 1927 Act.
A later statement delivered at the hearings also supports this view.
Patrick Tobin, the Washington representative of the ILWU, in discussing
longshoremen's accidents and the low level of federal benefits, observed:
162. S. REP., supra note 65, at 13.
163. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of
1972: Hearings on S. 2318, S. 525, and S. 1547 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1972).
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[Ilt is evident that longshoring is still an extremely hazardous industry.
Employees enter a new and relatively uncontrolled work place with
each ship that ties up to a pier. Cargo loaded elsewhere may be poorly
stowed; temporary decks may be overloaded; dangerous chemicals may
not be properly labeled; machinery may malfunction; there may be rats
or slippery dunnage, or many other unforeseen dangers beyond the
control of the workers. 164
Mr. Tobin's remarks seemingly refer to those employees who work in gang
units on ships and piers, and not to those engaged in terminal duties.
Finally, and perhaps most convincing, is the statement made by Joseph
Leonard, International Safety Director of the ILA in the House hearing on
the amendment. In discussing the strict division between accidents on the
pier and accidents in the vessel, he noted that:
What do we do, cut ourselves in half?
Federal compensation law stops at the gangplank to the pier. When
you come off of the gangplank you come under a different law; you come
under the state. Thirty-six States cover these docks and maybe more
now with the inland waterways.
It is time for a Federal law for compensation for all longshore-
men.165
Clearly, Mr. Leonard was referring to the classic problem created by
Nacirema and the water/pier line which it reaffirmed.
In light of these three illustrative excerpts, and in the absence of any
affirmative statements on extending coverage to terminal workers, it seems
that Congress, at least during the hearing stage, was not contemplating any
extension of coverage beyond the traditional longshore gang directly
affected by the Nacirema anomaly and the shift to containerization.
Nothing in the committee reports indicates that this evaluation changed
during the post-hearing stage. Therefore, the committee statement that
"with the advent of modern cargo handling techniques, such as containeri-
zation . . ., more of the longshoreman's work is performed on land then
heretofore," in all likelihood refers only to the effect of containerization on
the individual longshore gang, and not to the phenomenon of new types of
labor being performed by longshoremen at an inland situs.
Thus, a thorough consideration of the legislative history of the 1972
amendments and the literature on the nature of a modern port indicates that
the point of rest doctrine offers a credible resolution to the puzzle presented
by section 902(3) of the amended Act. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit's
analysis suffers from several major flaws. First, while the congressional
164. Id. at 130-31.
165. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Hearings on H.R.
247, H.R. 3505, H.R. 12006, and H.R. 15023 Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of
the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1972).
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committees' examples of covered and noncovered employees may support
the point of rest approach, the absence of explicit reference to the point of
rest in the committee reports is troubling. Indeed, accepting the point of rest
doctrine means that the LHCA's coverage will be defined by terminology
which appears in neither the statute nor the legislative history. In addition,
the committees' specific examples and general discussions are plagued by
ambiguity, undermining their usefulness. Moreover, it is unclear whether
the situs test of the amended Act retains any validity under the "point of
rest" theory. Although a "terminal" is expressly included as a covered situs
in section 302(a), the point of rest usually stops far short of the terminal
building. Point of rest analysis would therefore seem to render the word
"terminal" superfluous. Finally, the Fourth Circuit's opinion suffers from
the failure of the court to explain the point of rest by reference to the
operating procedures of modem ports. This absence of factual support
probably robbed the point of rest analysis of much of its potential impact.
Understandably, the seeming abstractness and arbitrariness of the point of
rest concept served only to make the opinions of the other circuits appear
much stronger 66
This is certainly true in regard to the Second Circuit's functional
equivalence analysis. From a conceptual standpoint, a container does
appear to be functionally equivalent to the hold of a ship. The stowing and
removal of individual pieces of break bulk cargo was and is a typical
activity engaged in by the longshoring "gang." The mere fact that this
procedure is now conducted in a pierside warehouse as opposed to the hold of
a ship would seem to make no difference.
However, the Second Circuit did not extend its analogy far enough.
Indeed, those employees stripping and stuffing containers in terminal
warehouses are engaged in an activity - freight handling - which goes on
daily in countless locales that have no connection whatsoever with the
water or "maritime employment." Those employees covered by the Second
Circuit's holding are doing no more than loading and unloading trailers, as
happens at trucking terminals everywhere. Yet the Second Circuit was
apparently able to conclude that the mere fact that marine terminals are
located near the water and handle freight ultimately destined for shipboard
loading, transforms the employees working inside these terminals in such a
way as to distinguish them from their brethren working inland.167 The
166. The commentary on the "point of rest" analysis has been uniformly critical.
See Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act:
Coverage After The 1972 Amendments, 55 TEx. L. REV. 99,.119 (1976); 54 N.C.L. REV.
925, 938-40 (1976); 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 210, 218-19 (1976); 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1179,
1187-93 (1976).
167. This "functional equivalence" analysis seems particularly odd in light of the
Second Circuit's recent decision regarding the "container clauses" in the ILA's labor
contract. See note 161 supra. For in that case the court affirmed the NLRB's
conclusion that stripping and stuffing containers holding the cargo of multiple
consignees was not a traditional ILA task. See ILA v. NLRB, 537 F.2d 706, 711-12 (2d
Cir. 1976); 90 HARV. L. REV. 815, 816-18 (1977).
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functional equivalence analysis, when logically extended, simply breaks
down.
The Second Circuit's "uniform coverage" analysis also presents
difficulties. In order for an employee to be covered under the amended Act
while loading a consignee's truck, the court stated that an injured claimant
would have to show'tlht he had "spen[t] a significant part of his time in the
typical longshoring activity of taking cargo on or off a vessel."' 68 As the
court apparently recognized, this proviso is crucial if any effect is to be given
to the committee re'port's statement that coverage extends to those
"employees who would otherwise be covered by this Act for part of their
activity." 6 9 Yet this proviso leads to anomalous results of its own. For
example, suppose two, workers are both employed by a marine terminal
operator as dock labor. While loading a consignee's truck, a piece of cargo
falls and both workers are injured. If one of the injured employees frequently
worked on a longshoring gang taking cargo on or off a vessel, he would
receive federal benefits; his. co-worker, who performed gang work only
occasionally (or not- at all) would receive the far less generous state benefits.
This unfair result cannot be avoided under the Second Circuit's analysis.17
0
The integral process theory is also appealing at first glance. This stems
in large part from the. court's observation that the committee reports, with
one possible ambiguous exception, were silent on whether employees
working in the geographic area located between the first cargo storage area
and the point where cargo is placed into land transit were covered by the
Act. In light of this silence, the court apparently thought it proper to give the
Act an extremely liberal construction in determining the treatment of those
employees working ,in this "intermediate" zone. In essence, the Fifth
Circuit's analysis allows the Benefits Review Board to employ a broad-
ranging factual inquiry in determining whether given employees are
engaged in maritime employment. Furthermore, the Board's inquiry would
not be hampered by any statutory language of a particularly confining
nature.
168. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 56 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted sub nom., Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1976) (Nos.
76-444, -454).
169. S. REP., supra note 65, at 13.
170. The First Circuit -also encountered difficulty in applying the Second Circuit's
proviso. Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 278-79 (1st
Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed,' 45 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S' Oct. 22, 1976) (No. 76-571). In
dicta the First Circuit attempted to skirt the proviso's problems by stating that the
"otherwise covered for part of their activity" language of the committee reports only
required "bona fide membership in a class of employees whose members would for the
most part have been covered some of the time under the earlier Act." Id. at 279.
However, this approach provides only a partial solution to the problem of two
longshoremen injured while loading a consignee's truck. The "class" of employees
referred to by the court, and covered in part under the 1927 Act, could only be those
longshoremen working in gangs. Therefore, the court's formulation would cover an
employee who occasionally worked with gangs, but not someone who worked solely in
a terminal as dock labor.
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Unfortunately, this is the most serious flaw in the integral process
analysis. First, it practically reads the status requirement out of the Act.
Indeed, such an unrestrained and unregulated approach to defining
"maritime employment" draws into that definition .those activities which
bear only the most tenuous relationship to matters which are "maritime." 171
Second, there is no evidence that Congress ever envisioned such a free-
wheeling approach. It is unlikely Congress would have offered a series of
examples of covered and noncovered employees if it intended essentially any
employee injured at a maritime situs to be covered by the Act.
CONCLUSION
Obviously, the choice between these three competing theories is not
easy. They each have flaws and virtues. However, on balance, the point of
rest doctrine meets a number of needs. First of all, it refers to a point that is
known and recognizable to employers and employees. Thus all parties are
aware of the nature and extent of LHCA coverage. Second, the point of rest
analysis, more so than the competing theories, will eliminate endless
litigation over what constitutes "maritime employment." In light of the
depressing history of the 1927 LHCA, with its hallmarks of uncertain
coverage and delayed compensation, the point of rest analysis represents a
distinct improvement. Third, the point of rest represents a distinctly
maritime solution to a distinctly maritime problem. Above all, the point of
rest is firmly grounded in industry practice and structural organization. In
contrast to the other theories, the point of rest is far less reliant on the
ambiguous words of the statute or the generally unilluminating legislative
history. Finally, and most importantly, the point of rest doctrine ensures
that "maritime employment" continues to retain some significant, practical
meaning. In light of the ILA's recent loss of its exclusive right to perform
stripping and stuffing activities landward of the point of rest,172 the nature
of the longshoring industry will continue in the state of flux which has
characterized it for over a decade. If Congress desires to take further action
in response to that change, it can do so. But for the present, the point of rest
doctrine accomplishes both what Congress desired .to do in the past, and
what it may well want to continue to do in the future - to ensure that those
employees engaged in distinctively maritime employment, whatever that
may be, receive adequate, swift, and sure workmen's compensation benefits,
without regard to the land or water situs of the accident.
171. For example, "classic" longshoring, as performed, by. gang labor, enjoys a
uniquely maritime connection by virtue of the place of performance - the vessel and
the pier immediately adjacent to it. In contrast, there seems to be little maritime
character in unloading trailers, stacking cargo, or unloading consignees' trucks.
172. See note 161 supra.
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ADDENDUM
After this Comment went to press, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous
decision written by Justice Marshall, rejected the point of rest' theory and
affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura.' In reaching its
decision, the Court ,a.qknowledged that the words of the statute and the
examples in the Cominittee Reports were silent as to whether claimants
Caputo and Blundo were covered by the 1972 Amendments to the 1927 Act.2
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that Caputo and Blundo were clearly
covered when "[c]ongideration [is given to] the purposes behind the
broadened coverage.";
In the case of claimant Blundo, who was injured while "checking" cargo
being unloaded from a'container, the Court found that Congress, in enacting
the 1972 Amendnmeits, expressly recognized that containerization "had
moved much of the longshoreman's work off the vessel and onto land."4 In
light of this, the Court found the Second Circuit's "functional equivalence"
argument compelling."The Court observed that a "container is a modem
substitute for the hold of the vessel" and that Blundo's checking tasks were
"clearly an integral part of the unloading process as altered by the advent of
containerization." 5 Thus, Blundo was clearly covered under the amended
LHCA.
However, the Court observed that the "congressional desire to accommo-
date the Act to modern technological changes" offered no solution for the
case of claimant Caputo, who was injured while loading a consignee's truck
with goods previously'unloaded from a ship.6 Nevertheless, the Court found
there was another "dominant" purpose behind the 1972 Amendments - that
"Congress wanted a 'uniform compensation system to apply to employees
who would otherwise be covered by this Act for part of their activity.' "7 The
Court construed this phrase to mean that any employee who spends at least
some of his time in tasks which are "indisputably longshoring operations"
is covered even while performing other, non-longshoring tasks.8 As Caputo
performed "longshoremen's gang" activities part of the time, he was
therefore covered under the amended Act even when engaged in other duties.
In its analysis of the "point of rest". argument, the Court stated that the
absence of this supposedly well-known term from the Act and the legislative
history was a major defect in the theory. 9 However, the Court felt the
theory's fatal flaw was its inability "to accommodate either the language or
1. Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 45 U.S.L.W. 4729 (U.S. June
17, 1977) affirming Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (1976). For
a discussion of the Second Circuit's opinion, see text accompanying footnotes 99-126.
2. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4733-34.
3. Id. at 4734.





9. Id. at 4736.
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the intent of the Amendments."' 0 Indeed, the Court noted that the "point of
rest" theory frustrated the "obvious" Congressional desire to cover all
employees engaged in the occupation of "longshoreman", regardless of
whether they were or were not performing clearly defined "longshoring
operations" at the time of injury.11
The Supreme Court's decision in Northeast Marine Terminals, for the
most part, is an unsatisfactory construction of the 1972 Amendments. It is
evident the Court experienced difficulty in reconciling the words of the
statute with the discussion in the Committee Reports. In particular, the
"otherwise covered for part of their activity" language of the Committee
Reports forced the Court to limit the coverage of the amended Act to those
terminal workers who have also worked in a longshoring gang. From a
practical standpoint, this is a most unsatisfactory solution. For instance,
suppose the accident which caused claimant Caputo's injury simultaneously
injured another employee working alongside Caputo. If this second
employee had never worked on a gang or performed other "indisputably
longshoring operations", then he would be ineligible for LHCA coverage.
Thus, under the Supreme Court's formulation, the end result would be
differing treatment for two employees injured in the same place by the same
accident.
The Court's treatment of injured stuffers, strippers, and checkers also
produces anomalous results. For example, those marine terminal workers
who are injured while handling containerized cargo will receive LHCA
benefits. Their brethren, injured in equivalent accidents while working in
truck depots (located, for example, across the street from marine terminals)
will receive the lower state benefits.
As a result, the Court, by virtue of the Northea8t Marine Terminal
decision, has created a variety of anomalies and inequities which seem to
defy logical resolution. In all likelihood, the Court will have to again
consider the 1972 Amendments in the near future in order to resolve these
problems.
10. I
11. Id.
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